














LOUIS N. CHRISTOFIDES 
AMY CHEN PENG 
 
 
CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 2096 










An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 









We process information in a large number of wage contracts, signed over a period of several 
decades, to generate the long-run history of the real wage for each bargaining pair. We term 
these hitherto unexamined histories ‘chronologies’. We are able to generate 1574 continuous 
real wage chronologies and we examine the evolution of the real wage in each case. We 
explore the influence of productivity growth, the industrial relations record of the pair, the 
influence of industry and region as well as the initial wage on the growth of the real wage rate 
over the decades in the sample. We conclude that these economically important forces can be 
statistically discerned in the wage chronologies. 
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For well over three decades now, economists have explored the unique and
detailed information contained in wage contracts in order to take into account
important institutional features of labour markets and in order to better
understand how these important markets behave. The studies of Hamermesh
(1970) and Sparks and Wilton (1971) pioneered the econometric exploration
of US and Canadian collective bargaining agreements (respectively). Riddell
(1979) is also in this tradition. With time, these explorations became broader
and began to cover other provisions of wage contracts such as (i) the incidence
and intensity of wage indexation issues, in inter alia Ehrenberg, Danziger and
San (1983, 1984), Card (1983, 1986), and Hendricks and Kahn (1983) and
(ii) the duration of wage contracts, in inter alia Christoﬁdes and Wilton
(1983), Vroman (1989), Murphy (1992, 2000), and Rich and Tracy (2004).
These are but a few examples of papers that deal with the major provisions
of contracts, some addressing several features at the same time and, more
recent ones, venturing into hitherto underappreciated aspects of collective
bargaining - e.g. Hendricks and Kahn (1986), Cramton and Tracy (1992),
Fortin (1996), Gu and Kuhn (1998), and Danziger and Neuman (2005).
Because the focus in these papers has been the information in collective
bargaining agreements available in unbalanced panels over relatively short
periods of time, these studies have overlooked a potentially informative aspect
of the data which derives from the fact that the entire history of the collective
bargaining agreements reached by a pair (a ﬁrm and a particular union) may
be available over a very long period of time. It is, therefore, possible to see
how important contract provisions for a given pair evolve over a matter of
1decades.
To be sure, the concepts of unexpected and uncompensated inﬂation, in
the sub-literature synthesized in Christoﬁdes (1987), for example, require
that contracts be connected so that information from the previous contract
can be allowed to inﬂuence the terms of the current agreement. However, this
connection is between consecutive contracts only. Also, the examination in
Christoﬁdes and Wilton (1985) of a possible wage ‘explosion’ in the aftermath
of wage controls relied on linking contracts under controls with those signed
by the same pair in the aftermath of controls. Finally, the papers on hold-
out pay particular attention to issues of timing between contracts. However,
the entire contractual history for each pair can be linked together, revealing
how important contract provisions change through time. The length of this
history is limited only by the available sample length and by possible breaks
in the relationship between pairs. It is therefore possible to speak of the
‘chronologies’ of contract provisions. Important provisions in contracts such
as the real wage, contract duration and the elasticity of indexation can be
traced out at the pair level through these chronologies. A number of ques-
tions that do not emerge naturally when the focus is individual contracts can
be posed and answered. For instance, a real wage chronology would show
how the real wage agreed to by a pair has evolved through long periods of
time, whether it has grown secularly to reﬂect productivity growth, whether
it depends on the industrial relations history of the pair, whether it diﬀers
from those agreed to by ‘comparable’ pairs and, if so, whether it ultimately
converges to them. Chronologies could examine at the pair level whether sec-
ular increases in contract duration, which might render the macroeconomy
2less ﬂexible, are pervasive - Christoﬁdes and Peng (2006) show that the av-
erage duration of contracts that became eﬀective in each year has doubled
between 1980 and 2000. A similar approach can deal with wage indexation
issues and the apparent decline of indexation through time also noted in the
above reference, a tendency that would work towards increasing real wage
ﬂexibility.
In this paper, we explore a particular long run feature of wage contracts,
focussing on real wage chronologies. In section 2, the data used and the
concept of a real wage chronology, as it derives from the contract data, are
discussed; features of the derived chronologies are also examined. In section 3,
the method used to examine these chronologies econometrically is presented
and the results obtained are discussed in section 4. Conclusions appear in
section 5.
2 Contract Data and the Wage Chronologies
The contract data used for this study is constructed from electronic records
provided by Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC), as it was
known when the data were released to us. This is the agency in charge
of industrial relations in Canada. The data base contains information on
11885 contracts signed between 1976 and 2000 by ﬁrms which employ 500
or more employees. Each contract contains a unique identiﬁer which al-
lows us to string together all agreements signed by the same pair. In order
to ensure the continuity needed in the chronologies, only contracts with an
uninterrupted history are included in the analysis, leaving 8928 contracts
3available for analysis - construction contracts are also excluded because they
were not part of the data until 1984. The HRDC data contain informa-
tion on a number of variables, including the settlement, eﬀective and expiry
dates of the contract, the number of employees that it covers, the indus-
try and region that it is located in, and the nominal base wage (including
‘fold-ins’ generated by the cost of living allowance clause (COLA) if any)
at the end of the previous contract pexpwage. Information in the current
contract makes it possible to generate the annual nominal wage percentage
change (including COLA generated increases)
·
w and the duration of the
contract measured as the diﬀerence between the expiry date and the eﬀec-
tive date of the current contract, Duration, in months. The nominal wage
level at the expiry date of the current contract may then be calculated as
expwage = pexpwage +( pexpwage × (
·
w/100) × (Duration/12))).
The nominal wage rates pexpwage and expwage are then converted into
r e a lt e r m su s i n gt h ev a l u e so ft h ec o n s u m e rp r i c ei n d e xa tt h ee x p i r yd a t e
o ft h ep r e v i o u sc o n t r a c t( i nm o s tc a s e st h i si se q u a lt ot h ee ﬀe c t i v ed a t eo f
the current contract) and the expiry date of the current contract. Thus, the
real wage level at the beginning and at the end of each contract are calcu-
lated in this way. Descriptive statistics on the variables used, by contract,
are presented in Table 1. Duration is shown to have a mean of 25.41 months
and a standard deviation of 11.62 months. The average nominal wage at the
end of previous contracts is $12.66 with a standard deviation of $4.55; at the
end of contracts, the average nominal wage is slightly higher at $13.69 with
a standard deviation of $4.57. The average real wage at the expiry date of
previous and current contracts is 15.13 and 15.24 respectively with standard
4Table 1
Summary Statistics Based on the Number of Contracts (NOBS 8928)
Variable Definition Mean St. Dev.
Pexpwage Nominal Wage at Expiry of Previous Contract 12.66 4.55
Expwage Nominal Wage at Expiry of Current Contract 13.69 4.57
Rpexpwage Real Wage at Expiry of Previous Contract 15.13 3.99
Rexpwage Real Wage at Expiry of Current Contract 15.24 4.00
Duration Length of the Contract (Months) 25.41 11.62
W dot Nominal Wage Adjustment (Annual %) 4.85 4.26
Nat. Res. Natural Resouce Sector 0.03 0.17
Manufact. Manufacturing Sector 0.20 0.40
Transport Transportation Sector 0.09 0.28
Commun. Communication Sector 0.04 0.19
Utilities Utility Sector 0.03 0.17
Trade Trade Sector 0.04 0.21
Education Education Sector 0.27 0.44
Health Health Sector 0.09 0.29
Service Service Sector 0.03 0.18
Others Other Sectors 0.18 0.38
Atlantic Atlantic Region 0.07 0.25
Quebec Quebec 0.16 0.36
Ontario Ontario 0.35 0.48
Prairies Prairie Region 0.17 0.38
BC British Columbia 0.12 0.32
Territories Territories 0.00 0.07
Multi Prov. Muti-province Contract 0.13 0.34
5deviations of 3.99 and 4.00 respectively. The average annual increase in the
overall (including COLA) nominal wage rate is 4.85% with a standard devi-
ation of 4.26. Figure 1 shows the real hourly contract wage calculated over
all contracts whose eﬀective date falls in a particular year. For comparison
purposes, Figure 1 also shows real hourly earnings1 from 1983 to 2000 - the
period over which the latter series is available. The contract real wage series
is higher and more volatile, especially during the 1990s. The relative position
of the two series is not surprising given that contract wages come from large
ﬁrms in the unionized sector. The greater volatility of the contract series
reﬂects the turbulent period of industrial relations in the public (provincial
and federal) sector during the period 1991 -1996, a period during which ac-
tive wage control policies were pursued. In addition, the contract series is
more likely to reﬂect idiosyncratic forces which average out in the aggregate.
Both series in Figure 1 show the remarkable stability in the unconditional
real wage through time. Apparently, there has been no perceptible real wage
growth over this period and, indeed, both series are below their starting val-
ues by the end of the period. One issue that is explored below is whether
productivity gains have inﬂuenced wage growth during this period.
The HRDC data base includes a regional identiﬁcation code and 3-digit
SIC code which allow us to create seven regional dummy variables (At-
lantic, Quebec, Ontario, Prairie, British Columbia, Territories and Multi-
province2) and ten industrial dummy variables (Natural Resources, Manufac-
turing, Transportation, Communication, Utilities, Trade, Education, Health,
1Hourly earnings are the CANSIM montly series V255025. They have been converted
into real terms using the CPI index (P100000) and have been averaged by year.
































































































































7Services and Others) that categorize each contract. Table 1 shows that most
contracts are in Education (27%), followed by Manufacturing (20%), and in
Ontario (35%). Figures 2 and 3 show the hourly real contract wage calculated
over all contracts, whose eﬀective date falls in a particular year, by SIC (Fig-
u r e2 )a n db yr e g i o n( F i g u r e3 ) .A si nt h ec a s eo fF i g u r e1 ,as t r i k i n gf e a t u r e
of Figures 2 and 3 is the remarkable ﬂatness of the series for each industry
and region. However, more features of interest are apparent at the indus-
try and regional levels. In Figure 2, remarkably stable inter-industry wage
diﬀerentials are apparent over this two-decade period. Services generally
have the lowest real wage while contracts in Education, Natural Resources,
Transportation and Manufacturing tend to have the highest real wages. This
ranking is consistent with the one in data from the 1986 Labour Market Ac-
tivity Survey of Canada established by Gera and Grenier (1994).3 Figure 3
shows similar information to that in Figure 2 but on a regional basis. Con-
tracts in the Atlantic provinces have the lowest real wages during most of
3There is a widespread view that industry eﬀects, which are signiﬁcant in individual
wage functions, cannot be easily explained by classical competitive theories of wage de-
termination (see Slichter (1950), Thurow (1976), Wachtel and Betsey (1972) and Cain
(1976)). Studies of wage determination based on human capital and mobility frictions
typically leave substantial unexplained inter-industry or inter-ﬁrm wage diﬀerentials - see
Dickens and Katz (1987) and Krueger and Summers (1988). Helwege (1992) shows that
those diﬀerentials are not highly positively correlated with subsequent employment growth,
as one could expect if they resulted from mobility frictions. Gibbons and Katz (1992) in-
vestigate the possibility that diﬀerentials are explained by unmeasured ability diﬀerences
but do not have encouraging results. The more recent study by Walsh (1999) shows that











































































































































































































































































































































10this period while contracts in British Columbia and Ontario have the highest
real wages - note that a common price index has been used to deﬂate across
regions. Again, this ranking is consistent with stylized facts about regional
disparities in Canada over the period studied. In the empirical work below
we take into account possible industry and region eﬀects. There is slight
visual evidence of some convergence in the series of Figure 3, a general issue
t ow h i c hw er e t u r nb e l o w .
The key innovation in this paper is arranging the contract data into pair-
based chronologies. This is achieved by sorting the contracts using the unique
identiﬁer for each pair. Overall, 1574 unique chronologies can be created. The
longest chronology involves as many as 19 renewals and spans a horizon of
24 years. Figure 4 presents the 17 longest real wage chronologies in Manu-
f a c t u r i n g .E a c hl i n es h o w st h er e a lw a g eh i s t o r ye m b o d i e di nt h ec o n t r a c t s
signed by a particular pair. For instance, the top line joining the circles shows
that this particular pair agreed to the highest sequence of real wages among
all the chronologies shown. The ﬁrst dot shows the beginning-of-contract
(i.e. pexpwage) real wage for a one-year agreement that became eﬀective
in 1979 and the next dot its end-of-contract real wage (i.e. expwage); the
latter is higher than the former, indicating that there was real wage growth
during this contract. The end-of-contract real wage is also the (prior to the)
beginning-of-contract wage for the next agreement which became eﬀective in
1980 and lasted until 1983. This second contract entailed a reduction in the
real wage rate. This may have occurred despite increases in the nominal wage
rate if, as was likely, inﬂation was unexpectedly strong during this contract.4







































































































































12The third contract in the sequence begun in 1983; it was a two-year contract,
and did entail real wage growth. The particular chronology discussed shows
the changing pattern of contract duration for the pair involved and follows
a slight upward trajectory. This is generally true of the other chronologies
shown in Figure 4. There is considerable diﬀerence in the real wages paid by
t h et o pa n db o t t o mc h r o n o l o g i e s ;i nt h ec a s eo fF i g u r e4 ,t h i sd i ﬀerence is
more than ten real dollars per hour. This is noteworthy given that, in both
cases, the real wage shown is the base wage for ﬁrms in manufacturing, albeit
not necessarily ﬁrms of the same size and not necessarily paid to workers with
similar skills who are represented by the same unions. It should be noted
that this diﬀerence remains even if we conﬁn eF i g u r e4t oO n t a r i o ,t h e r e b y
reducing (but not necessarily eliminating) an important part of regional dis-
parities. A ﬁnal feature of Figure 4 is that not all chronologies begin or end
at the same time.
For some purposes, it is useful to have common starting and ending points
for these chronologies. For instance, any discussion of the inﬂuence of the
initial wage and convergence would be facilitated if this condition were satis-
ﬁed. With this in mind, we selected a ﬁx e dw i n d o wo f2 2y e a r s ,f r o m1 9 8 0t o
2001, and discarded the modest amount of information outside this window.
When a chronology is incomplete, either at the start or at the end of the
window, we use information in the extant chronology to complete it. More
precisely, we calculate the average annual growth rate ‘Grate’ Gratei =(
ln wTi− ln w0i) /Tover the entire extant chronology of length T and use
this to compute the starting (1980) level of the real wage; wTi indicates the
in Christoﬁdes and Stengos (2003).
13expiry wage expwage at the end of the last contract and w0i the initial wage
pexpwage at the beginning of the ﬁrst contract in the chronology. The re-
sulting information is used in Figure 5 to illustrate how the values of Grate
in the 387 chronologies in Manufacturing relate to the logarithm of the ini-
tial wage in the respective chronology. A negative relationship, statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% level, is suggested - ﬁgures in brackets are t-statistics.
We return to this issue in the empirical section below.
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics on important variables based on the
set of 1574 chronologies. The average value of Grate is 0.0032, suggesting that
the very ﬂat proﬁle of the illustrative chronologies in Figure 4 is more broadly
representative. The standard deviation of Grate is 0.0136. The average value
of the real wage rate at the start of the historical chronologies is 14.43 real
dollars5 with a standard deviation of 3.94. When the historical chronologies
are completed back to 1980 (where this is necessary), the average value of the
real wage in 1980 is 14.62 with a standard deviation of 4.7.6 The closeness
of the ﬁgures in rows 2 and 3 of Table 2 suggests that the historical and
completed chronologies are not very diﬀerent. This, despite the fact that
the completed average length of the chronologies over this window is 12.01
years. The number of renewals in the historical chronologies is, on average,
5Note that this number is lower than the ﬁgure of 15.13 real dollars reported, in the
contract-based Table 1, as the average real wage at the expiry of the previous contract
because it is calculated at an earlier point in time.
6The fact that the 1980 average real wage of the completed chronologies exceeds the
average real wage at the start of chronologies (row, 3 versus row 2 in Table 2) suggests
that the real wage chronologies that have had to be projected back to 1980 entailed higher


















































































































































































































155.67 with a standard deviation of 3.93. Regarding industries and regions, 25
percent of all chronologies are from the manufacturing sector and 33 percent
of them are from Ontario.
A variable that has an important long-run role in the wage determination
process is productivity growth. The variable ‘Prod’ is is deﬁned as the annual
growth rate of an index of labour productivity over the length of each his-
torical chronology. It was generated from Statistics Canada Table 383-0005
and was attached to the HRDC database using the three-digit SIC code and
the eﬀective date of the contract. Prod has a mean of 0.0171 and a standard
deviation of 0.0183 over the chronologies in the sample - Table 2. While this
average annual growth rate is modest, it would, over the two decades studied,
justify a noticeable increase in the real wage rate. We examine whether what
is apparently not evident in the averages plotted in Figures 2 and 3 can be a
signiﬁcant statistical force at the individual chronology level.
Another variable that may condition real wage outcomes in the long run is
the professionalism and eﬀectiveness of the industrial relations practices fol-
lowed by the bargaining pair. These practices are not exercised in a vacuum
but, rather, reﬂect the economic environment that the pair operates within.
A variable that may capture both aspects is the duration of negotiations be-
tween the pair Durneg leading up to the agreed upon contracts that make up
the chronologies. In the HRDC data, this variable is measured as the length
of time between the oﬃcial notice to bargain and the settlement date for the
contract. It has a mean of 8.18 months and a standard deviation of 4.37
months - Table 2. Cramton and Tracy (1992, 1994) suggest that holdout,
which is intimately related to Durneg, entails loss of productive eﬃciency
16Table 2
Summary Statistics Based on Real Wage Chronologies (NOBS 1574)
Variable Definition Mean St. Dev.
Grate Real Wage Growth Rate (Annual, Fraction) 0.0032 0.0136
W0 Real Wage at the Start of Chronologies 14.43 3.94
W0 - Projected Real Wage Projected to 1980 14.62 4.70
W0 - Instrument Real Wage Projected to 1980 - instrument 14.62 3.29
Length Length of Chronology (Years) 12.01 7.20
Count Number of Contract Renewals 5.67 3.93
Durneg Duration of Negotiations 8.18 4.37
Pdurneg Duration of Negotiations of Previous Contract 7.74 4.05
Nat. Res. Natural Resouce Sector 0.04 0.19
Manufact. Manufacturing Sector 0.25 0.43
Transport Transportation Sector 0.11 0.31
Commun. Communication Sector 0.04 0.20
Utilities Utility Sector 0.02 0.16
Trade Trade Sector 0.06 0.24
Education Education Sector 0.19 0.39
Health Health Sector 0.10 0.31
Service Service Sector 0.04 0.21
Others Other Sectors 0.14 0.34
Atlantic Atlantic Region 0.06 0.24
Quebec Quebec 0.19 0.39
Ontario Ontario 0.33 0.47
Prairies Prairie Region 0.14 0.35
BC British Columbia 0.12 0.32
Territories Territories 0.00 0.07
Multi Prov. Muti-province Contract 0.15 0.35
Prod Labour Productivity Growth 0.0171 0.0183
17which may then be reﬂected in wage growth. In a number of games, the pie
gets smaller with delays in reaching agreement. We, therefore, take account
of this variable in the empirical work below.
We also report, in rows 2 and 4 of Table 3, an alternative initial real wage
and the average value of the duration of negotiations in the previous contract
Pdurneg.These variables are used to deal with possible endogeneities in the
regression analysis that follows - see the next section. For the moment, we
note that, though they are independent of current-contract notions, they
are close (in terms of descriptive statistics) to the variables that they will
instrument.
3M e t h o d o l o g y
Having introduced the concept of the wage chronology and having traced out
1574 such chronologies in various industries and regions, we turn to an econo-
metric analysis of the determinants of the annual rate of real wage growth,
Grate, implied in each chronology. As already noted, this rate is established
for each chronology over its life, a life that may be shorter than the 22-year
window between 1980-2001. We control for industry and region eﬀects but
also explore the inﬂuence of the other variables mentioned above, namely
the average (over the chronology) annual rate of productivity growth Prod
and the average (over the chronology) duration of negotiations embarked
on by the pair Durneg.W h e n t h e i n ﬂuence of the initial real wage is also
taken into account, this wage is normalized at its 1980 value. In the case of
incomplete chronologies, Grate is used to project the earliest available real
18wage backwards to 1980 and, in light of this, Grate remains the appropriate
regressand.
The forces of wage arbitrage and convergence would imply a negative re-
lation between Grate and the initial real wage lnW0. However, measurement
of this process could be complicated by unobservables. If, for example, the
forces of managerial dynamism that make for sustained growth over time
(such that Grate deﬁned over the entire chronology is high) also imply con-
servative wage setting preferences on the part of the ﬁrm, the initial wage
might also be unusually low. Thus, the initial wage when it is included as
a regressor may be negatively correlated with the equation error term; if so,
the estimator of the coeﬃcient on lnW0 will be biased. In order to avoid
this possibility, we instrument (using Two Stage Least Squares) the initial
1980 wage for each chronology using a relevant average of starting wages
which excludes the own wage for each particular chronology. This average
is calculated at the detailed three-digit industry level (rather than the more
aggregate level used in the regressions) and for the province (rather than the
more aggregate region used in the regressions) within which each particular
chronology is located - see row 4, Table 2. Its natural logarithm is used to
instrument the natural logarithm of the initial real wage lnW0.
A similar complication may arise with respect to Durneg. If, for instance,
large settlements that are due to unobservables take longer to negotiate,
then the error term may be positively related to Durneg, leading to bias
in the estimation of its coeﬃcient. The potential problem here may not
be severe: An unobservable that makes for a high wage settlement may
not always involve long negotiations if it is acknowledged by both sides of
19the bargain. In addition, in the regressions that follow, Durneg is deﬁned
as an average over all the contracts signed by the pair in each chronology,
thereby weakening the endogeneity mechanism. Nevertheless, we explore
two robustness procedures: First, we proxy the industrial relations context
within which the bargaining pair works with the previous-contract duration
of negotiations (Pdurneg), see row 8, Table 2 for descriptive statistics. In
an alternative approach, we treat Pdurneg as an instrument, in which case
the predicted values for Durneg and lnW0 in Two-Stage-Least Squares are
constructed from all exogenous variables as well as the two instruments.
These speciﬁcations are explored in the appendix Table A1. All estimation
is carried out with SAS.
In all cases, the average number of employees in each chronology is used
to weight the data for each chronology.
4 Empirical Results
Table 3 contains the estimates obtained. Results I-III refer to weighted OLS
regressions where the possible endogeneity of lnW0 is not taken into account.
Result I reports the regression of Grate on an intercept, Prod and Durneg
only. Prodhas the expected positive coeﬃcient and it is signiﬁcantly diﬀer-
e n tf r o mz e r oa tt h e1 %l e v e l . Durneg has a negative coeﬃcient which is
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level. When the logarithm of the
initial wage is added, in Result II, the estimates on the coeﬃcients of Prod
and Durneg are not substantially altered and the initial wage has a nega-
tive coeﬃcient which is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level. The
20negative coeﬃcient suggests some degree of convergence in that chronolo-
gies with large values of their initial 1980 real wage tend to be associated
with low values of Grate. Industry eﬀects (Manufacturing is the omitted
class) and region eﬀects (Multi-province contracts are the omitted class) are
added in Result III. The coeﬃcients for these eﬀects are generally signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level. The estimated industry eﬀects are
consistent with the location of the proﬁl e si nF i g u r e2a n dt h er e s u l t si nG e r a
and Grenier (1994). This suggests that the stylized facts on inter-industry
diﬀerentials apply to base wage rates as well and, indeed (given that the
regressand is wage growth), the stylised facts may become stronger through
time. The estimated region eﬀects are consistent with generally held views
on regional income diﬀerences and growth patters during this period; for
instance, realizing that comparisons are made indirectly through the omit-
ted class of multi-province chronologies, Ontario chronologies have relatively
high growth and those in the Atlantic provinces, Quebec and the Prairies
relatively low growth, suggesting that regional diﬀerences in base wage rates
may increase.
The instrumental variable estimates appear in Results IV and V. Result
IV, which excludes the industry and region eﬀects, is quite similar to Result
II, the main diﬀerence being the reduced t v a l u ef o rt h ec o e ﬃcient on the in-
strumented initial wage, which nevertheless continues (at -10.56) to indicate
that the logarithm of the initial wage has a coeﬃcient which is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level. Result V is analogous to Result III
and generally similar except that chronologies in the Atlantic, Quebec and













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































22involving multi-region contracts. A Hausman (1978) speciﬁcation test ac-
cepts equality between the OLS and IV estimates and, indeed, the coeﬃcient
estimates in Results III and V are very close.
Using the estimates in Result V, it is worth considering the quantitative
importance of the estimates for the explanatory variables Prod, Durneg
and lnW0.A ni n c r e a s ei nProd by one standard deviation (0.0183 in Table
2) would have the eﬀect of increasing Grate by 0.000926 (0.0506×0.0183).
This is approximately 29% of the mean value of Grate (0.0032) in Table 2.
While this is not an enormous eﬀect, it is not negligible either. Thus, the
average annual productivity growth experienced over a chronology does have
a measurable eﬀect on the average annual growth rate of real wages over a
chronology. An increase in Durneg by one standard deviation (4.37 in Table
2) would decrease Grate by 0.000874 (-0.0002×4.37), an eﬀect comparable
to that of an increase in Prod by one standard deviation. Thus, the ability
of the pair to work eﬀectively at the bargaining table does appear to have an
impact on the real wage fortunes of the pair. Finally, an increase in lnW0 by
one standard deviation (0.25 in Table 2) would decrease Grate by 0.00455 (-
0.0182×0.25). This suggests, relative to the productivity eﬀects, substantial
eﬀects through the convergence processes. The eﬀects of the convergence
calculations are about ﬁve times as large as those for productivity.
While the economic case for the endogeneity of Durneg is not overwhelm-
ing, it is important to examine whether the conclusions reached above are
robust to the procedures outlined in the previous section. In general, these
robustness checks are favourable and we, therefore, conﬁne their detailed
presentation to an appendix. Note that a Hausman (1978) speciﬁcation test
23accepts the equality of the OLS and IV estimates. Table A1 reports details
of these checks. In the ﬁrst regression, the variable Durneg is replaced by
Pdurneg. The estimated coeﬃcient (-0.0004) is equal to that reported as
Result I in Table 3. When the instrumented version of lnW0 is added to the
Prodand Pdurneg, the estimated coeﬃcient (t value) is, at -0.0157 (-10.21)
very similar to Result IV in Table 3. This is also true when industry and
region eﬀects are included (columns 5 and 6, Table A1). In the alternative
robustness check, Pdurneg is used as an instrument for Durneg (columns
7t o1 2 ,T a b l eA 1 ) ,w h i l elnW0 continues to be instrumented as described
above. In column 7, Table A1, the estimate for the coeﬃcient on Durneg
is higher and that for Prod lower than in column 1, Table A1. However,
this diﬀerence disappears in the more complete speciﬁcations: In the most
complete speciﬁcation (columns 11 and 12, Table A1) Durneg entails a coef-
ﬁcient (-0.0002) which is identical to that in column 9, Table 3, albeit with a
t v a l u ew h i c h ,a t- 1 . 9 7 ,i n d i c a t e ss i g n i ﬁc a n c ea tt h e5 %b u tn o tt h e1 %l e v e l .
The coeﬃcients on Prod and lnW0 continue to have the expected signs and
be signiﬁcant at the 5% level but they are somewhat lower in absolute val-
ues relative to those in column 9, Table 3. Thus, the calculations for their
quantitative signiﬁcance discussed above may present maximal impacts. In-
dustry eﬀects in these regressions are not much aﬀected, though the regional
eﬀects display two noteworthy changes, namely the now (relative to Result
V ,i nT a b l e3 )s i g n i ﬁcantly lower growth in real wages in Quebec and British









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































255C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we take a fresh look at the information contained in the
repeated wage agreements struck by bargaining pairs over more than two
decades with the view to examining, not the collective bargaining outcomes
at a point in time that have been studied so far, but the long run outcomes
implied in these bargains. This focus on the outcomes of individual bargains
complements studies at more aggregative levels. While a number of outcomes
such as contract duration and indexation can in principle be considered, we
focus on real wage chronologies that trace out the long run pattern of real
wages for each pair in the sample. This is an approach that has not been
followed so far and one that, hopefully, casts light on the long run behaviour
of the all-important notion of the real wage.
We generate the average annual growth rate in the real wage for each
chronology and study the inﬂuence of productivity growth, the speed with
which the bargaining pair can reach agreements and the initial wage on this
growth rate. We do so controlling for and estimating industry and region
eﬀects that are consistent with intensiﬁcation of the stylized facts on inter-
industry and regional wage patterns. We ﬁnd that productivity growth and
the bargaining skills of the pair inﬂuence the long-run growth in the real
wage. Convergence in real wages, controlling for the other variables men-
tioned above, appears to be at work and it appers to be quantitatively strong.
The results in this paper pertain to the unionised sector, of course. While
l o n gr u na n a l y s i so ft h i sk i n di so n l yp o s s i b l eb e c a u s eo ft h en a t u r eo ft h e
information in this sample, the results obtained may illuminate behaviour
in the broader economy. Christoﬁdes and Stengos (2003, footnote 8) report
26that the employees covered by this data represent 11% of the Canadian labour
force. To the extent that similar results hold for contracts involving small
numbers of employees (these are not represented in the data sources that we
tap), our ﬁndings would be more broadly applicable. It is worth recalling
that, in contrast to the US, union membership in Canada as a proportion
of non-agricultural employment is relatively high (32% in 1999). As longer
panels on individuals become available, it would be interesting to focus on
the long run labour market experience of individuals, appropriately averaged
over wide-enough groups to remove idiosyncratic eﬀects. To our knowledge,
these individual-based chronologies have not been studied and it is hoped
that this paper may help stimulate interest in that direction.
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